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ABSTRACT
Data-driven decision-making consequential to individuals raises
important questions of accountability and justice. Indeed, Eu-
ropean law provides individuals limited rights to ‘meaningful
information about the logic’ behind significant, autonomous deci-
sions such as loan approvals, insurance quotes, and CV filtering.
We undertake three experimental studies examining people’s per-
ceptions of justice in algorithmic decision-making under different
scenarios and explanation styles. Dimensions of justice previ-
ously observed in response to human decision-making appear
similarly engaged in response to algorithmic decisions. Qualita-
tive analysis identified several concerns and heuristics involved
in justice perceptions including arbitrariness, generalisation, and
(in)dignity. Quantitative analysis indicates that explanation styles
primarily matter to justice perceptions only when subjects are
exposed to multiple different styles—under repeated exposure of
one style, scenario effects obscure any explanation effects. Our
results suggests there may be no ‘best’ approach to explaining al-
gorithmic decisions, and that reflection on their automated nature
both implicates and mitigates justice dimensions.
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INTRODUCTION
Important decisions—about the allocation of jobs, loans, or
insurance—are increasingly based on the predictions and clas-
sifications of computer models. By training such models on large
datasets of previous customers or employees, organisations seek to
more accurately estimate the risks and rewards of different actions
and act accordingly—sometimes even automatically. Such prac-
tices are commonly referred to as ‘algorithmic decision-making’,
and have caused both celebration and consternation [67, 43, 56].
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for
profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on
the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s)
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee.
Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
CHI’18, April 21–26, 2018, Montréal, Canada
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. ISBN
978-1-4503-5620-6/18/04. . . $15.00
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3173951
However, such decisions have significant consequences for
those individuals directly affected by them [31]. While human
decision-makers may exhibit errors of judgement and biases,
we can at least demand that they rationalise their decisions and
thereby hold them accountable. A significant body of research in
legal and organisational psychology suggests that people do not
only care about whether the outcome of a decision benefits them,
but also whether it meets standards of justice [71, 40, 11]. In
particular, information about decision-making processes plays an
important role in justifying the decisions that are made. In their
basic form, algorithmic decision-making systems do not naturally
provide information relevant to justice judgements, and therefore,
threaten the capacity for accountability inherent in human
decision-making [6]. In relying on such systems, we therefore
run the risk of important decisions being made unaccountably.
The challenge to justice has long been recognised in contexts
where data-driven decision-making is used in government admin-
istration [64]. The increasing use of predictive systems by both
private and public bodies has prompted regulation aimed at render-
ing them more transparent. The European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) (and similarly, the preceding 1995
Directive) requires organisations deploying certain systems to
provide affected individuals with ‘meaningful information about
the logic’ behind their outputs [81]. Similarly, the United States’
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) requires lenders to provide
‘statements of reasons’ when applications are denied loans [32].
These legal requirements give rise to HCI challenges concerning
how the outputs of such systems should be communicated to
affected individuals and other stakeholders. These challenges are
not entirely new. The ability to provide information about how
a system derives its predictions or classifications has long been
recognised in the AI, expert systems, and HCI communities [8,
50, 16]. However, recent work has addressed the novel challenges
of complex machine learning models, whose logic and outputs
are otherwise harder to explain. So-called ‘model-agnostic’
approaches aim to explain the outputs of any classifier, regardless
of the machine learning algorithm used to train it [62].
The potential for, as well as the limitations of, such approaches
to address these regulatory requirements have been noted [20,
65, 82]. By implementing these explanation facilities within
their algorithmic decision-making systems, organisations may be
able to meet their obligation to provide ‘meaningful information’
about how their decisions are made. However, evaluation of the
human factors of such systems has primarily tested their utility
in supporting expert decision-making (for instance, in clinical
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diagnostic settings [7]). The kind of meaningful information
required by experts is likely to differ from that required by
individuals affected by automated credit scores, insurance
pricing or hiring decisions, for the purposes of accountability as
envisaged by the relevant regulatory regimes.
This study aims to provide a preliminary exploration of the ways
in which a range of novel explanation approaches might serve
regulatory goals of rendering algorithmic decision-making more
fair, accountable, and transparent. In particular, what effects
do explanations have on people’s perceptions of algorithmic
decisions with respect to these regulatory aims? Do different
explanation approaches meet these aims in different ways? To
explore these questions, we conducted a series of studies, both
lab-based and online, examining people’s responses to a series
of scenarios involving algorithmic decisions accompanied by
different explanation styles inspired by recent work on fairness,
accountability and transparency in machine learning.
BACKGROUND
The questions raised above are connected to multiple distinct
areas of research, including: the psychology of justice perceptions
regarding decision-making; the design of interpretable models
in machine learning and HCI; and interdisciplinary work at the
intersection of machine learning, law and social sciences.
Interpreting intelligent systems
The ability to interpret a system’s outputs has long been a core
theme of research into intelligent systems. As a general principle,
systems should be able account for their own operation in ways
that help users understand how their tasks are being accom-
plished [16, 66]. Early knowledge representation and reasoning
systems typically aimed to meet this requirement by producing
explanations for their outputs, for instance by presenting deriva-
tions from rules in rule-based architecture [69, 8], or graphical
representations of nodes and edges in the case of Bayesian
networks [37]. Explanation facilities could be further augmented
by explicitly modeling the knowledge engineering and design
process and revealing information about them to end-users [50].
Inspired by different theoretical models of argumentation, various
explanation types have been explored and tested, with the style
of explanation provided affecting the extent to which end-users
understand the decisions of expert systems [46, 39].
Various research suggests that users—again, primarily experts—
may in certain cases systematically over-rely on the outputs
of intelligent systems [26, 19], while in others they may
systematically distrust systems, despite reassurances as to their
accuracy [57, 24]. However, the provision of explanations can
affect levels of trust and acceptance of algorithmic decisions. In
some cases, explanation increases trust and reliance [33, 85, 1,
30, 60], but in others an explanation may have the opposite effect
if the level of detail it contains is deemed insufficient [7].
The increasing popularity of machine learning models as decision
making tools presents novel challenges for explanation, as it may
not be as straightforward to extract the embedded ‘knowledge’
behind their outputs [73]. This problem is particularly pronounced
for complex models, like many-layered neural networks, but even
simple decision tree models can quickly become uninterpretable if
they have too many branches. As users form mental models [52]
of machine learning systems over time, such long-term exposure
may lead to greater understanding [76] and greater trust and
reliance [47]. But in the absence of transparency from platform
providers, end-users may develop folk theories of algorithms,
leading to a diverse range of strategies and countermeasures with
varying degrees of effectiveness [22, 14].
Recent work on interpretable machine learning has focused on
providing primarily pedagogical [73], local explanations for the
outputs of ML models: pedagogical in the sense that the expla-
nations teach something about how the model works rather than
attempting to represent it directly, and ‘local’ in that they focus
on how a specific output was derived. Approaches such as Local
Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) [62] and
Quantitative Input Influence (QII) [13] enable an end-user to see
a list of features which contributed to the output, along with the
strength and direction of the contribution to the outcome class.1
Case-based explanations provide examples from the model’s
training data which most closely resemble the output in ques-
tion [12, 54], while ‘demographic’ explanations provide statistics
on the outcome classes for relevant demographic variables [2].
While these different explanation styles suggest promising ways
to explain the outputs of any classifier, explanation quality—or
‘interpretability’—does not have a formal definition or a stan-
dard evaluation methodology shared amongst machine learning
researchers [15, 41]. Explanation serves different functions in
different contexts, and its evaluation is therefore context- and
purpose-dependent. To this end, various human subjects exper-
iments have been undertaken, exploring whether particular ex-
planations result in better performance on a given end-task, in
comparison to a no-explanation baseline. Contexts studied include
aiding medical experts in diagnosis, increasing test performance of
users of personalised learning environments, or enabling network
security analysts to correctly identify incidents (e.g. [34, 83, 21]).
The use of various explanation styles has been been widely
explored in the field of recommender systems. Tintarev and
Mastho identify seven purposes for recommender system expla-
nations, namely: transparency, scrutability, trust, effectiveness,
persuasiveness, efficiency and satisfaction [74]. Explanations can
also be used to justify or describe [80]. While early recommender
system explanation approaches provided a uniform explanation
style for single-source collaborative filtering [30], more recent
work explores how to derive explanations for recommender
systems based on ‘hybrid’ multiple sources [36] and matrix
factorisation [61]. However, a reported need for explanation may
not always correspond to differences in behaviour or performance;
in a study of news recommender systems, end-users expressed
a desire for explanations, but the number of news items they
opened did not change when provided with reasons for their
recommendations [70].
The use of local, pedagogical explanation facilities has not
yet been tested in the contexts affected by the aforementioned
emerging regulatory requirements, such as the automated
evaluation of people for loans, hiring, and insurance. While
various tools designed to help decision-makers identify and
1Layer-wise Relevance Propagation/Deep Taylor Expansion [45],
decomposes the innards of deep learning systems to provide similar
results to LIME (without directionality), and is also relevant here.
correct discrimination in data mining exist, these are aimed at
data scientists implementing systems rather providing information
to the individual decision-subjects affected by them [3, 59, 29, 23,
28]. The potential for local, pedagogical explanation systems to
provide justice-related information, fulfilling the policy goals of
transparency, accountability and fairness, has recently been noted
by computer scientists and law scholars [20, 65, 82]. It has been
suggested that organisations might rely upon these explanation
facilities to fulfill legal duties to provide meaningful information
about the logic of specific system outputs to affected individuals.
Perceptions of justice regarding decision-making
In order to explore how such explanation facilities might serve
the aims of justice in algorithmic decision-making, a clearer
understanding of the psychological aspects involved in justice per-
ceptions is required. To this end, it is worth considering the extant
literature on perceptions of justice regarding human decision-
making. Decisions made about people with significant effects,
such as court decisions, hiring, firing and promotion in a work-
place, or the allocation of financial products, are often contentious
and require a higher burden of accountability than other decisions;
they should meet the standards of ‘bureaucratic justice’ [42]. Early
work in this area emphasised that perceived levels of justice of
a decision outcome are separate from purely self-serving rational-
isations of a decision outcome; an individual might be negatively
affected by a decision whilst still thinking it is just [71, 40].
According to Colquitt and others, justice perceptions can be
broken down into several aspects or antecedents [10]. Procedural
justice concerns the processes, logic and deliberation behind a de-
cision. Distributive justice concerns the allocation of positive and
negative outcomes in a decision context and whether they are dis-
tributed equitably or deservedly amongst the affected population
given their circumstances, performance or contributions. Interac-
tional justice concerns the extent to which the affected individual
is treated with dignity and respect by the decision-makers. Finally,
informational justice pertains to the information and explanations
provided for decisions; are they candid, thorough, and tailored
to individual needs? These aspects of justice are distinct but
correlated [10]. Receiving a thorough explanation (informational
justice) is important in helping people to assess whether the
decision-making procedure is just (procedural justice) [10]. In
turn, decisions perceived to be procedurally just are more likely
to be perceived as distributively just [79]. Such findings provide
a rationale for giving individuals rights to information about
significant decisions; requiring decision-makers to explain their
decisions should promote informational justice, which should help
people assess procedural justice and distributive justice in turn.
This rationale might plausibly apply to the regulatory regime
around algorithmic decision-making. Requiring organisations
to explain the logic behind their algorithmic decision-making
systems (informational justice) enables affected individuals to
assess whether the logic of the system is just (procedural justice),
which in turn might moderate their assessments of fairness of
the decision outcomes (distributive justice). In so far as these
notions of justice capture the aims of the regulatory requirements,
they may provide appropriate ways of measuring the adequacy
of different explanation systems for these purposes.
Key questions and contributions
This work builds upon and contributes to these disparate areas of
research. Work on perceptions of justice reveals much about the
role of explanations in ethical assessments of human decisions,
but the applicability of these findings to algorithmic decisions
and the range of proposed explanation systems proposed for them
remains largely unexplored. A notable exception is Kizilcec,
who studied the effect of levels of transparency on perceptions of
procedural justice [35]. However the nuances of the different ex-
planation approaches recently developed in interpretable ML have
not yet been explored in relation to perceptions of justice. We also
do not yet know much the extent to which findings on correlations
between perceptions of justice from human decision-making
contexts hold in the context of algorithmic decisions.
Furthermore, as research into practically achievable explanations
for machine learning systems accelerates, researchers are turning
to consider which explanation styles are more desirable, rather
than simply possible to implement [41, 15]. This itself is a loaded
question: an explanation style that artificially inflates certain
notions of justice by playing on cognitive biases might suffer
from the same anti-paternalist critiques levied against proponents
of ‘nudge’ philosophy [44]. Understanding how explanation
styles might influence and interact with justice perceptions is
therefore an important preliminary to further development of ML
explanation tools.
With these issues in mind, our key questions are:
1. How do explanations for algorithmic decisions affect justice
perceptions regarding algorithmic decisions? In particular,
do the positive correlations observed between informational,
procedural and distributive justice in human decision-making
settings also hold in algorithmic decision-making settings?
2. How do different styles of explanation affect such justice
perceptions?
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In investigating these questions, we combine several method-
ological aspects of the related work from justice perceptions and
intelligent systems research. Many of the previously mentioned
machine learning model explanation systems have not been sub-
jected to user evaluations, and those which have often only test
people’s ability to predict a model’s outputs, or answer questions
about its logic (e.g. [39]). For present purposes, we are not con-
cerned about how faithfully an explanation facility imparts actual
model logic to a user.2 Rather, we are interested in how the provi-
sion of various kinds of information about a model’s outputs might
affect justice perceptions as measured in the psychological litera-
ture. Much of this research is based on field surveys of individuals
with personal experience of being affected by decisions (e.g. [79]),
although controlled experiments involving simulated decision-
making and scenario-based methods have also been used [78].
Given our focus on the effects of information provision and ex-
planation styles on perceptions of fairness, we conducted a set
of experimental studies to elicit people’s responses to a range of
2Although we acknowledge this is an important challenge if explanations
are to be more than just comforting stories, as cautioned by Lipton [41].
plausible algorithmic decision scenarios and associated explana-
tions. While this may lack the ecological validity of field surveys,
it gives us the ability to engage people with a wide range of novel
explanation styles covered in 2.1), and have yet to be implemented
alongside real machine learning systems currently deployed ‘in the
wild’ to any significant degree. By testing out proposed explana-
tion styles with fictional scenarios, we hope that designers can gain
insight into user concerns, and perhaps create more meaningful
explanation interfaces to meet the upcoming legal requirements.
Scenarios and application contexts
We selected 5 application contexts in which to situate the fictional
scenarios. The main criteria for context selection were: a relatively
common interaction for the target population (a large proportion
has experienced or will experience it at some point in their
life); likely to involve machine learning models for algorithmic
decision-making (at present or in the near future); have significant
economic or practical effects on the decision-subject; and would
possibly fall under the aforementioned GDPR regulation on
automated decisions.3 After consulting relevant literature on how
ML systems are being applied in each context (e.g. [43, 38, 43,
55, 72]), we settled on the following contexts:
1. Applying for a personal financial loan;
2. Applying for a promotion at work;
3. Car insurance premiums dynamically priced based on personal
details and driving behaviour measured by a telematic sensor
(as described in e.g. [77]);
4. Passengers on over-booked airline flights being selected for
re-routing;
5. Freezing of bank account due to activity suspected as
associated with money laundering;
For each context, we created fictional cases in which an individual
has had a decision made about them automatically. These were in-
spired by now-classic algorithmic ‘war stories’ [20] (see, e.g. [56,
58]). Scenarios and cases were adapted where necessary to fit the
context from which the in-person participants would be recruited
(a city in the United Kingdom). Because explanations are most
likely to be requested in response to a decision which has a neg-
ative outcome for the individual, and considerations of procedural
justice have been found to be more strongly felt in such cases [4],
each scenario ended in a negative outcome for the individual.
Explanation styles
In order to derive a set of explanation styles to test, we reviewed a
range of research, including both technical work on interpretable
machine learning models, and legal discussions on the require-
ments of existing and forthcoming regulations on transparency
of algorithmic decisions (e.g. [81, 65, 20]. Our aim was to find
explanation styles which could plausibly meet or exceed the
regulatory requirements regarding transparency of automated
decisions, in particular the requirement that organisations provide
‘meaningful information about the logic involved’ in an automated
decision (GDPR art 15(h)). We aimed to condense the many
3The hurdle that a decision must be ‘based solely on automated process-
ing’ is here read less restrictively than legal analysis has indicated [81, 20].
different proposals into a smaller set of explanation styles based
on the kinds of information they would likely present to the
end-user. We included only explanation methods which were
model-agnostic; i.e. are applicable to any kind of learning
algorithm, such as LIME [62], rather than methods which only
work for particular ML models (e.g. those restricted to random
forests [68] or neural networks [45]). This review resulted in 4
categories of promising explanation style:
1. Input Influence: Presents a list of input variables alongside
a quantitative measure of their ‘influence’, positive or negative,
on a decision (e.g. [13, 86])
2. Sensitivity: For each input variable used in a decision,
sensitivity analysis shows how much the value of that variable
would have to differ in order to change the output class (not
to be confused with the notion of sensitivity used in ML
evaluation) (e.g. [63, 65]).
3. Case-based: Presents a case from the model’s training data
which is most similar to the decision being explained (e.g. [18])
4. Demographic: Presents aggregate statistics on the outcome
classes for people in the same demographic categories as
the decision-subject, such as age, gender, income level or
occupation (e.g. [2])
These explanation styles were tested and refined in a small-scale
informal design phase. Each explanation system imparts different
information, which is presented in various ways in the literature,
including text [18], graphs [62] and bullet points [86]. In order
to control for these differences in representation, we chose to
use purely textual explanations. We informally tested each
explanation style by varying the wording and information
dimensions. We found that people generally did not pay attention
to explanations independent of scenario descriptions. Through
iterative testing we found that the use of dialog boxes focused
attention on explanations (see Figure 2). These were deployed
and investigated in depth in an in-person lab study and two online
experiments. All phases of each study were approved by relevant
University ethical review procedures.
Justice constructs
The justice constructs used in all three studies were based on those
developed in the psychology of justice research, summarised by
Colquitt et al [11]. Participants were asked to rate their agreement
with five statements on a 5-point Likert scale (see statements at
the bottom of Figure 1). Statements were drawn and adapted from
previous studies of human decision-making to fit scenarios in
which the decision was being made by an automated algorithmic
system. Preliminary testing found that certain questions from
Colquitt’s scale, particularly those relating to interactional justice
such as ‘Have you been able to express your views and feelings
during those procedures?’ were difficult to interpret. This was
partly due to the hypothetical nature of the scenarios, and partly
due to being too human-specific to apply to a computer-based
interaction. The remaining questions pertained to informational,
procedural and distributive justice. Statement 2 (understanding)
aimed to capture informational justice [27]; statements 3 and 4
(appropriateness of factors, fair process) pertained to procedural
justice; and statement 5 (deserved outcome) addressed distributive
Car insurance scenario: A car insurance company provides customers with
personalised prices based on their attributes and driving behaviours, measured
through a telematic sensor installed in the car. Their system for setting prices is
based on a computer model, which predicts how likely an applicant is to have an
accident and make a claim. The computer makes its predictions based on data the
system has collected about thousands of other drivers.
Based on its ongoing analysis of the driver’s chances of having an accident, the
system will automatically set their monthly premium. The cheapest premium tier,
given to those drivers who are judged by the system as the safest, is 20 per month.
Sarah
Sarah is a customer of the insurance company. She is:
• 35 years old
• Has been driving for 17 years
• Been in an accident once which was not her fault
• Drives 800 miles a month on average
• Exceeds the speed limit on average once every two months
• 20% of Sarah’s driving takes place at night
Based on this information, the computer system has not qualified Sarah for the
cheapest tier of insurance premium. The insurer provides Sarah with the following
information about the computer’s decision.
"This decision was based on thousands of similar cases from the past. For example,
a similar case to yours is a previous customer, Claire. She was 38 years old, with
18 years of driving experience, drove 850 miles per month, occasionally exceeded
the speed limit, and 25% of her trips took place at night. Claire was involved in one
accident in the following year."
Please rate your agreement with the following statements
1. Agreement: ‘I agree with the decision’
2. Understanding: ‘I understand the process by which the decision was made’
3. Appropriateness of factors: ‘The factors considered in the decision were
appropriate’
4. Fair process: ‘The decision-making process was fair’
5. Deserved outcome: ‘The individual deserved this outcome given their
circumstances or behaviour’
Figure 1. Example of a scenario (car insurance), case description (Sarah),
explanation (Case-based), and questions
dimensions [11]. We also found that people tended to interpret
these justice construct statements as a proxy for the simpler
question of whether or not they agreed with the decision; to avoid
this, an additional statement about agreement (1, agreement) was
also included prior to the others.
Phase 1: Lab study
The first study consisted of in-person semi-structured interviews
focused around a series of fictionalised cases as described above.
The purpose of this study was to gain in-depth insights into
how people interpret, evaluate and reason about algorithmic
decision-making in the range of contexts and explanation styles
mentioned above.
19 participants were recruited through paper flyers placed in
various permitted locations in a small city in the UK (including
cafés and restaurants, churches, libraries, shops, and museums),
and through official social media accounts of the research lab
and personal accounts of the researchers. Participants were then
invited to the lab where the study occurred, which was set up
with a standard PC keyboard and mouse, and a 27-inch display
with a screen resolution of 1920x1200.
Participants were presented with 3 cases for each of the 5 contexts,
(15 cases in total) via a web-based interface. Cases were presented
with a brief description of the individual, the decision outcome,
the explanation (except in the control condition) and an illustra-
tive image depicting the context. The cases were used to prompt
reflection on various aspects of the decision, and any explanatory
information provided, using a concurrent think-aloud process [51].
Participants were asked to consider their agreement with the five
measures described in section 3.3 and Figure 1. Agreement was
indicated on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘strongly agree’
to ‘strongly disagree’. Participants were asked to verbalise their re-
sponses to each case and explain their thought processes for each
response. Each case was presented with one of the 4 explanation
styles described above, or a control condition in which no explana-
tion was provided. Participants were assigned pseudonymous iden-
tifiers to be associated with data generated during the experiment.
Audio recordings taken from the interviews and think-aloud pro-
cesses were transcribed, segmented and labelled by each case and
explanation style, and any personally identifying information was
redacted. Thematic analysis was undertaken to identify common
themes in participants’ interpretation, evaluation and reasoning in
response to cases. Thematic codes were independently developed
by three coders, after which a single set was jointly agreed upon.
The data were then re-coded using the new set of codes.
Phase 2: Online studies
Following on from the lab study, two online studies were
conducted in order to generate quantitative data to test the
following hypotheses:
1. Do different explanation styles result in differences in
perceived levels of justice?
2. Do the positive correlations observed between informational,
procedural and distributive justice in human decision-making
settings also hold in algorithmic decision-making settings?
Both online studies consisted of pared-down versions of the
protocols used in phase 1. Participants were recruited via the
study platform Prolific Academic,4 and filtered to include
only individuals over 18 based in the UK, in order to maintain
similarity with the participants recruited in phase 1.
A between-subjects design was used in order to test differences
between responses under different explanation conditions. On
the basis of described responses to the various explanation
styles in the lab study, it was hypothesised that the ability to
make direct comparisons between explanation styles might
affect justice perceptions. We therefore also devised a follow-up
within-subjects experiment, to test whether exposure to multiple
explanation styles for a single case would have different effects
than repeated exposure to a single explanation style.
Between-subjects study
325 participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 5 conditions (n =
65 in each group). Each group was presented with a selection of 12
cases used in experiment 1, accompanied by one of the 4 different
explanation styles or a control condition featuring no explanation.5
Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the 5
measures described in phase 1 using the same Likert scale.
Within-subjects study
The within-subjects study involved 65 participants. Only the loan
and insurance cases were included in this design, as the other
4www.prolific.ac
5The airline context was excluded at this stage, because experiment 1
had revealed that participants almost universally judged the cases to be
very unfair and undeserved, thus preventing any useful conclusions to
be drawn from this context.
Our predictive model assessed your
personal information and driving behaviour
in order to predict your chances of having an
accident. The more +s or -s, the more
positively or negatively that factor impacted
your predicted chance of accidents.
Unimportant factors are indicated.
> Your age (---)
> Driving experience (---)
> Level of adherence to speed limit (-)
> Number of trips taken at night (++)
> Miles per month (+)
> 29% of female drivers qualified for the
cheapest tier.
> 31% of drivers in your age group [30–39]
qualified for the cheapest tier.
> 35% of drivers with 17 years of experience
qualified for the cheapest tier.
> 15% of drivers who have been on one
accident which was not their fault qualified
for the cheapest tier.
> 26% of drivers who regularly travel at
night qualified for the cheapest tier.
> 21% of drivers who exceed the speed limit
once ever two months qualified for the
cheapest tier
This decision was based on thousands of
similar cases from the past. For example, a
similar case to yours is a previous customer,
Claire. She was 38 years old with 18 years of
driving experience, drove 850 miles per
month, occasionally exceeded the speed
limit, and 25% of her trips took place at
night. Claire was involved in one accident in
the following year.
> If 10% or less of your driving took place at
night, you would have qualified for the
cheapest tier.
> If your average miles per month were 700
or less, you would have qualified for the
cheapest tier.
ok! ok! ok! ok!
Input influence–based explanation Demographic–based explanation Case–based explanation Sensitivity–based explanation
Figure 2. Illustrative examples of the different explanation types presented to participants: input influence, sensitivity, demographic and case based.
scenarios could not be adapted to fit into a realistic hypothetical
scenario in which four different explanations would be presented
for a single case. Participants were therefore presented only with
cases drawn from the Loan and Insurance contexts, in which
the individual has received negative decision outcomes from 4
different lenders/insurers. Each decision was explained using
a different style (in a random order), allowing participants to
directly compare multiple styles applied to an individual subject.
Data from both studies were analysed with Spearman’s rho
correlations to understand if justice constructs correlate in the
same way as reported in the aforementioned psychology of
justice literature, and an ANOVA with Tukey’s post-hoc paired
tests to understand how explanation styles relate to each other
in light of different justice constructs. Details on both methods
are presented further below alongside the analysis.
RESULTS
Participant information
The lab study featured 19 participants, 11 male, 8 female, with an
average age of 28.8 (range = 21-60, sd = 10.2). They had a range
of educational attainment, comprising: high-school / A-levels (4),
Bachelors (7), Masters (7) and PhD (1). In terms of familiarity
with the decision-making contexts featured in the study, 6 had
experienced applying for a loan, 6 had sought a car insurance
deal, 5 had experience of promotion at work, 8 had had their bank
accounts frozen, and 1 had been bumped off a flight. Average
time to complete the study was 34 minutes (sd = 6.56).
For the between-subject online study, 64% were female, with an
average age of 37.6 (r = 17-69, sd = 11.4); 48% were in full-time
employment, 26% were unemployed, 21% were in part-time
employment (3% listed ’other’). Education levels comprised
high school (16%), A-level (27%), undergraduate degree (34%),
Masters (16%), and Doctorate (0.4%). 25% had experienced
applying for a loan, 34% had sought a car insurance deal, 26%
had experience of promotion at work, 14% had had their bank
accounts frozen, and 2% had been bumped off a flight. Average
time to complete the study was 7.5 minutes (sd = 3.26).
For the within-subject online study, 64% were female, with an
average age of 39.77 (range = 24-70, sd = 11.8); 66% were
in full-time employment, 14% were unemployed, 19% were
in part-time employment (1% listed ’other’). Education levels
comprised high school (20%), A-level (18%), undergraduate
degree (42%), Masters (17%), and Doctorate (3%). 26% had
experienced applying for a loan, 30% had sought a car insurance
deal, 32% had experience of promotion at work, and 9% had had
their bank accounts frozen. Average time to complete the study
was 8.1 minutes (sd = 3.59).
Qualitative Results: Themes and reflections
The think-aloud responses from the lab study resulted in five
major themes: the lack of human touch; interpretations of the
system’s reasoning; the use of statistical inference; the degree
of actionability in an explanation; important aspects which were
seen to be unaccounted for by the system; and the meaning and
relevance of moral concepts. Many of these themes occurred
across different explanation styles and scenario types; although
some reflections were particularly concentrated around certain
explanation styles and scenarios, which are noted below.
The (lack of) human touch
An initial reaction from many participants concerned the indignity
or ‘weirdness’ of algorithmic decision-making compared to
human decision-making. A series of comments reflected upon
the ways in which the very use of an algorithmic decision-making
system could be impersonal and dehumanising for the subject of
the decision. In response to a case in which an employee had been
automatically rejected for a promotion, participant DC remarked:
‘[sarcastically] This really makes you feel like a valued
employee! When a machine or some kind of system makes
a decision about someone based on some kind of data
points, then it’s impersonal’ –DC
Others considered it problematic that with an automated system,
‘there’s no sense of negotiation’ (DR), and no opportunity
for ‘human interaction’ (CS). In contrast to this apparent lack
of humanity (or perhaps to counteract it), some participants
attempted to humanise or anthropomorphise the system [48], one
participant for instance describing it as ‘rude’ (OR).
For the same participant, the specificity of the figures used in
some explanations (particularly, input influence and sensitivity)
lead her to conclude that the computer must be using arbitrary
thresholds, which in itself seemed ‘mean’:
‘Oh that’s so mean! [...] I can’t do the maths, but why is
it so specific? Hmmm. I don’t understand. I don’t know
why the cut-off is like that.’ –OR
Such remarks suggest that if algorithmic decisions are held to
norms of social behaviour, interactional justice may be a relevant
dimension for evaluation.
Interpreting the system’s ‘reasoning’
Many of the reactions concerned attempts to decipher the logic
of the algorithm. Some subjects made their assessments on the
basis of whether the system approximated their own reasoning
or knowledge:
‘The computer [...] used the same sort of reasoning that I
did I guess’ –MP
‘Yeah I understand this decision [denying a young male
cheap car insurance], because young males are much more
likely to have accidents’ –PC
Others tried to articulate the system’s reasoning as a series of
rules and consequences:
‘Breaking the speed limit is breaking the law, therefore
you are proving that you are not capable of meeting the
standards for the cheapest insurance, which is presumably:
“thou shalt obey all the laws”.’ –AS
In some cases, while the individual premises seemed understand-
able, their relevance to the reasoning behind the overall decision
was not:
‘It seems like I can understand every one of them, but if put
into the picture [...] each point is relevant, but I don’t know
[how] it puts into the big picture’ –OR
Faced with seemingly inexplicable reasoning processes, some
participants concluded that the system must be simply ‘making
it up’ (OR) and therefore on the face of it unfair.
Acceptability of statistical inference
In addition to concerns about indignity and opaque reasoning,
participants commonly reflected on the (un)acceptability of
generalisation and statistical inference as a basis for prediction
and decision-making in general. Issues raised in this regard were
the importance of scientific rigour, including the use of sufficient
sample sizes:
‘I don’t know how many previous customers they’re basing
it on...’ –VI
‘I’m gonna assume that it looked at more than just John and
was like: ‘You’re like these people and these people didn’t
perform very well so we’re not gonna give you a promotion”
–MP
However, many other participants expressed strong objections to
the use of statistical inferences to make judgements about people
in itself:
‘This is just simply reducing a human being to a percentage.
It’s not taking any of his actual ability, success or whatever
into account. It’s just saying ‘tough luck’, you can only
expect to be successful 20 percent [of the time]’ –UT
‘This is saying your gender determines how you act, how
you operate, and that’s based on sheer probability.’ –BF
‘Perhaps it’s unfair to make the decision by just comparing
him to other people and then looking at the statistics, he isn’t
the same person.’ [...] ‘They [...] seem like [...] just random
stats, not reasons for why you’d make a decision’ –MP
Some emphasised that an individual who seems similar to
past individuals may in fact have extenuating circumstances,
particularly in response to case-based explanations:
‘Just because Joel performed badly in the end doesn’t mean
that Jing [will] perform badly, because there could’ve been
other influencing factors’ –MP
In addition to comparisons between different individuals,
participants also commented on the acceptability of judging a
single individual’s future behaviour on the basis of their past
behaviour. However in this case, some participants were more
comfortable with inductive inferences; AS agreed with the
computer’s decision to deny a loan applicant with existing debts
because they had already ‘proven not to be able to pay it back’.
Actionability
In judging the appropriateness of certain features, or the fairness
of a decision, issues of personal responsibility and the possibility
of acting differently were frequently raised. Some participants
were happy to endorse negative decisions if they were able to
identify a reasonable alternative course of action available to the
participant which would resulted in a different outcome, as in
sensitivity-based explanations:
‘If he’s not earning enough money for the company to
feel they can give him a loan of 5,000 pounds, then that’s
fair. But they’re also giving him an alternative in there; ‘if
you had an extra 2,000 pounds income, you’d have been
successful’, or ‘if you’d asked to borrow [...] less, you’d
have been successful’. Which is the right thing to do—reject
him, but give him alternatives.’ –MP
Where an individual was deemed at fault for risky or otherwise
undesirable past behaviour, participant AS believed the decision
was particularly justified:
‘Drive more carefully [...] unless it is down to entirely
unluckiness, you had a lot of accidents so you deserve it
[being denied cheap insurance]’ –AS
Conversely, where a judgement was made on the basis of
circumstances which were outside the individual’s control, or the
course of action suggested was deemed unrealistic, the outcome
was seen as undeserved:
‘I don’t think she could have done anything [...] she didn’t
make any poor decisions that led to this, so I somewhat
disagree that she deserved it’ –PC
‘You don’t choose where you’re born, you don’t choose
your gender.’ –BF
Several responses suggested that explanations ought to help guide
future action, something which was particularly lacking in the
demographic explanations:
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Figure 3. Tukey’s post-hoc paired tests showing comparative differences between answers in different scenarios by question (horizontal facet), scenario (vertical
facet), study design (color) and explanation type (y-axis). Insignificant results are displayed in lower transparency for convenience.
‘What do you do with ‘1.5% of women have had their
accounts frozen’? That gives you nothing, no information
you can do anything with’ –PC
Although participant CS was concerned that behaviour change
in response to an algorithm could prove dangerous
‘If you know it’s on the back of an algorithm, it would
incentivise people to work out how to game the algorithm,
to find out what the algorithm is exactly doing’ –CS
Unaccounted aspects
Many criticisms of the decisions came down to things that were
missing or unaccounted for. For some, it was the absence of
important information:
‘It should also base it on his credit score as well’ –VD
‘I think the bank ought to know a bit more about you’ –DR
‘We have no idea why John wasn’t able to pay off the loan,
he may have suddenly been made suddenly terminally ill’
–UT
In some cases, what was missing was not just information, but
also complexity:
‘If you just ask them more questions you could find
out they’re fine [...] or just make the algorithm more
complicated’ –DR
In others, the missing element was a sense of proportionality.
Responding to an input influence explanation for denial of a loan,
VI remarked:
‘ I don’t know why [...] why he’s got a minus 7 for existing
debts. I think the information was relevant but I think it’s
kinda out of proportion’ –VI
Meaning and relevance of moral concepts
The meaning and relevance of moral concepts like ‘fairness’ and
‘desert’ in the context of a computer system was occasionally
questioned by certain participants. Participant PC struggled to
evaluate the moral dimensions of computer-driven decisions:
‘These last two questions [‘Was the decision-making process
fair?’, ‘Did the individual deserve this outcome?’] are hard
to answer... You can’t really make a judgement about a com-
puter, if you tell it to do something and it just does it.’ –PC
For DR, here was a sense that the very notion of ‘fairness’ may
not be attributable to a system that is primarily designed to serve
a different organisational goal like efficiency:
‘Fair in this sense hasn’t really come into it, this is like a cold
decision [...] It’s not fair at all really, but it’s understandable
from the perspective of the business’ –DR
One participant argued that a truly random system could also be
seen as more ‘fair’, at least for certain definitions of fairness:
‘I suppose the fair thing would be to just do it completely
randomly [...] like a Harvey Dent definition of fair—from
Batman, you know, Two Face?—"You know what’s fair?
Chaos is fair!"’ –DR
Quantitative results
To recap from the methodology, 325 participants from the Prolific
Academic platform were presented with different scenarios and
different explanation styles, and asked to respond to questions
that related to them on 5-point Likert scales.
Do justice correlations from human decision-making settings
hold in relation to algorithmic decisions?
According to the literature on justice perceptions above, we should
expect to find correlations between fair process and deserved
outcome, understanding and fair process, appropriateness of
factors and deserved outcome, and appropriateness of factors and
fair process [10]. We were not expecting strong links between
appropriateness of factors and understanding (as with a high
level of understanding, one might find the factors inappropriate)
or understanding and deserved outcome (as we suspect that
judgments about deserved outcomes to be more dependent
on inputs than on processes). To examine this, we calculated
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients (with 0.05 confidence
level bootstrapped intervals). The results (see Table 1) partially
confirmed our hypotheses, as the stronger correlations were
connected to the construct connections we believed would exist.
Surprisingly, we also found significant positive correlations
between the two construct connections we were not expecting.
Do different explanation styles result in differences in
perceived levels of justice?
In order to examine contexts in which a decision subject is faced
with a single explanation style per decision, we conducted a
between-subjects study. To examine contexts in which subjects
are faced with multiple explanation styles per decision, we
conducted a within-subject study (like the qualitative study),
which featured multiple explanation styles per decision.
We used ANOVA tests, followed by Tukey’s post-hoc paired
tests [75], to analyse the relative effects of different explanation
styles within different study designs.6
In the between-subjects study, explanation styles generally did
not significantly affect justice perceptions, with the exception
of fair process in loans only (loan F(3, 258) = 2.71, p = 0.046)
and appropriate factors (F(3, 258) = 5.35, p = 0.001) showing
significant between group differences.
In the within-subjects study—where multiple explanation styles
were presented for the same decision—significant effects were
observed across all questions and decision-making contexts.
There was a significant effect of explanation styles on perceptions
of fair process (loan scenario F(3, 260) = 7.52, p < .001; insurance
scenario F(3, 260) = 4.5, p = .004), on the perception of appro-
priate use of factors (loan F(3, 260) = 3.312, p = .02; insurance
F(3, 260) = 6.44, p = .0003), and on the perception of deserved
outcome (only in the loans case, F(3, 260) = 7.31, p = .0001).
Tukey’s post-hoc paired tests (see Figure 3) showed that case-
based explanations result in lower perceptions of appropriateness,
fair process perception, and (in the loans case) deservedness,
consistently compared to sensitivity based styles and occasionally
compared to other styles. This is an effect primarily observed,
like most effects in the quantitative part of our study, in the
within subject study design, indicating that the act of comparison
in a particular scenario is important for these differences to
become apparent. Case-based explanations seem to have the most
consistent negative impact on justice perceptions when presented
alongside alternative explanation styles.
Q1 Q2 lower rho upper
Fair Deserved 0.63 0.69 0.74
Fair Appropriate 0.53 0.60 0.66
Appropriate Deserved 0.43 0.51 0.58
Fair Understand 0.32 0.40 0.49
Appropriate Understand 0.31 0.40 0.48
Understand Deserved 0.28 0.36 0.44
Table 1. Spearman’s rho correlations for justice constructs with boot-
strapped (1000 rep) confidence interval at 0.02 level.
DISCUSSION
Faced with a range of algorithmic decision-making scenarios, peo-
ple appear conflicted about how to respond to questions of justice.
6Some readers might have reservations over parametric tests being ap-
plied to ordinal data: we point to recent literature that has emphasised [53]
that Likert data are robust to parametric assumptions, and that ‘parametric
methods can be utilized without concern for “getting the wrong answer”’.
For some participants, the very idea of an algorithmic system mak-
ing an important decision on the basis of past data seemed unfair;
‘She’s been a victim of this computer system that has to
generalise based on, like, somebody else ... what it should be
looking for is ability to pay back the loan, not characteristics
of others who couldn’t pay back the loan’ -WP
Whereas for others, delegation of such responsibility to a
computer, and the authority of statistical models, actually
removed the relevance of questions of fairness altogether; the
system ‘just does what it is supposed to’, and as long as its
inferences are accurate, it could be seen as ‘statistically fair’ (PC).
In this sense, while algorithmic decision-making implicates
dimensions of justice, it may also mitigate them, in so far as
people resist imputing morality to a computer system [25, 5].
On the other hand, people frequently interact with computers
as if they were social actors [49]; why stop when justice is
involved? One participant described how she might have it both
ways, simultaneously entertaining dual standards of justice, one
juridical, the other computational;
‘I would say I agree he deserved this outcome given the
way this computer model has judged his behaviour, whether
he actually deserved this outcome remains to be seen. If
we were in a court of law, I would argue we don’t know his
circumstances, but given this computer model and the way
it works it’s deserved.’ -WP
Such attempts to delineate moral culpability between systems and
people, or between different standards of fairness or evidence,
may reflect a more general psychological need to see the
world as morally coherent [9]. The introduction of algorithmic
systems seems likely to shake up previously stable categories and
concepts, requiring adjustment and incorporation into one’s moral
world-view.
In terms of the value of providing explanations, and the
relative importance of different explanation styles, the picture is
complicated. On the one hand, people strongly engaged with the
details of each explanation when discussing each case. This was
borne out in the within-subjects experiment, where significant
differences were observed in justice perceptions between different
explanation styles—in particular that case-based explanation
styles impacted negatively on justice-related judgements
especially compared to sensitivity-based explanation styles. And
yet, in the between-subjects design where individuals were
exposed to only one explanation style repeated across multiple
cases, these explanation effects largely disappeared.
One possible explanation is that when people repeatedly see the
same explanation style, they become habituated and pay more at-
tention to the features of the cases rather than any specific features
of the explanation provided. When exposed to multiple explana-
tion styles regarding the same case, the differences may become
more salient. While one-off interactions with individual systems
seem most likely, both scenarios—comparison of multiple styles,
and exposure to a single style—may occur in different real world
contexts. For instance, people may realistically face multiple
explanations for similar algorithmic decisions when applying for
a loan, mortgage or credit. Various explanation tools already exist
within the credit scoring industry, and a savvy consumer might
well test them all out when preparing for a significant application.
The relative consistency in justice-related judgements between dif-
ferent explanation styles might also be explained by strongly-held
intuitions about the variables used in a decision. While different
explanation styles represented the input variables in different
ways, the case descriptions all featured the same set of inputs. If
people have strong intuitions about the fairness of using particular
features in a model (regardless of their weights), as has been
observed in a previous study by Grgic et al [28], this may account
for such consistency. Another important factor may be the extent
to which experimental design allows interpersonal comparison.
Research on justice judgements in non-automated contexts
has found that individuals pay more attention to other people’s
outcomes than they do to information about the procedure behind
the decision that affects them [78, 84].
Finally, the observed correlations between different justice
constructs fall largely in line with those observed within the psy-
chology of justice literature amassed since the 1970s. Procedural
and distributive dimensions had a relatively high correlation coef-
ficient of 0.69; for comparison, a 2001 meta-analysis of 45 studies
in a variety of organisational and institutional settings reported
a correlation coefficient of 0.48 for the same constructs [10].
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
While the combination of different methods employed in
these three studies goes some way to addressing the problems
associated with any single approach, there are a number of
limitations which are important to mention.
Threats to validity
First, the samples were not representative of the general
population. Participants for the in-person lab study were all drawn
from an affluent and academically dominated city, and from the
UK where experiences of certain decision contexts (e.g. financial
loans) likely differ to other countries (e.g. those with greater or
lesser dependence on private debt). Participants in the online stud-
ies were not gender balanced, with almost double the number of
females to males. Second, the scenarios considered were hypothet-
ical, not affecting the participants directly, and therefore lacked the
first-person consequences and significance of a real world deci-
sion, as well as the possibility of alternative courses of action such
as requesting a human review or appealing the decision. The ex-
planations were also not drawn from real machine learning model
outputs due to our desire to understand explanations in the context
of rejections and not to introduce confounding elements—but in
practice, this might introduce additional complicated factors. Fi-
nally, comparisons were made between four different explanation
styles, but further confirmatory work may be needed to address
the specific reasons for differences between explanation styles.
In particular, the explanation styles proposed in the interpretable
machine learning literature vary in the information they contain.
Despite our efforts to standardise them, differences in the length
and format of the text required to impart an explanation between
explanation conditions may have been a confounding factor.
Future work
A number of opportunities for future work arise from this dis-
cussion and limitations. One would be to consider the application
of other possible measures and methods from the psychology
of justice research, such as interactional justice. Indeed, some
participants’ remarks (e.g. about the computer being ’rude’)
suggest that there may be useful notions of interactional justice
even when humans are not directly involved in communicating
the decision. Another would be to examine how to design systems
designed to make ML outputs interpretable in different ways to
multiple end-users for different ends; not only the data scientist
attempting to detect and mitigate discriminatory effects (e.g. [3]),
but also other stakeholders such as third party auditors. This is
part of a wider need to consider how to re-engineer better user
experiences for multiple stakeholders interacting with machine
learning systems in general [17].
CONCLUSION
Algorithmic decisions are likely to become increasingly relied on
for a range of decisions with potentially important repercussions
for those affected. Understanding how people assess the fairness
of such decisions, and how explanations might help, is therefore
of increasing significance. Despite repeated calls for more trans-
parency over how such decisions are made, there is still much to
learn about what people want and need to know about algorithms
in order to hold them accountable to justice. As lawmakers leg-
islate for mandatory provision of information to decision-subjects,
human-computer interaction research has much to offer in how
such information should be extracted, presented and delivered.
This paper suggests that people do consider justice-related aspects
of algorithmic decision-making systems, much as they do for
manual decision-making processes. However, depending on
how and when they are deployed, explanations may or may not
help individuals to evaluate the fairness of such decisions. The
algorithmic nature of these systems results in an array of novel
considerations which are not captured by traditional research on
perceptions of justice. Conversely, creators of ML explanation sys-
tems have not typically designed them with the information needs
of those individuals facing significant personal consequences
of model outputs in mind. It is our hope that such concerns will
instigate renewed focus on this range of important use cases for
algorithmic explanations, and more broadly for HCI research
to support the pursuit of justice as algorithmic decision-making
systems take hold in a wide array of high-stakes domains.
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